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1 Introduction
This article presents the communication model leading to a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium for a strategic form game as a learning process through robust mes-
sages in the p-belief system associated with a partitional information structure.
We show that
Main theorem. Suppose that the players in a strategic form game have the
p-belief system utth a common prior distribution. In a communication prooess
of the game according to a protocol with revisions of their beliefs about the other
players’ actions, the profile of their future predictions converges to a mixed strat-
egy Nash equilibrium of the game in the long run.
t This PaPer is a preliminary version, and the final form will be published elsewhere.
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Recently, researchers in economics, AI, and computer science become enter-
tained lively concerns about relationships between knowledge and actions. At
what point does an economic agent sufficiently know to stop gathering infor-
mation and make decisions? There are also concerns about the complexity of
computing knowledge. The most interest to us is the emphasis on the consid-
ering the situation involvlng the knowledge of agroup of agents rather than of
just asingle agent.
In game thmretical situations, the concept of mixed strategy Naeh equilib-
rium (J.F. Nash [12]) hae become central. Yet alittle is known about the process
by which players learn if they do. This article will give acommunication protocol
run by the mutual learning leading to amixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a
strategic form game $hom$ the point of distributed knowledge system.
Let us consider the following protocol:The players start with the same prior
distrlbution on astate-space. In addition they have private information given
by apartition of the state space. Beliefs of players are posterior probabilities: A
player $p$-believes(simply, believes) an event with $0<p\leq 1$ if the posterior prob-
ability of the event given $his/her$ information is at least $p$ . Each player predicts
the other players’ actions as $his/her$ belief of the actions. $He/she$ communicates
privately their belie&about the other players’actions through messages through
robust messages, which m\’esage is approximate information about $his/her$ indi-
vidual conjecture on the others’ actions greater than $his/her$ exact conjectures
as the conditional probability under $his/her$ private information. The recipients
update their belief according to the messages. Prmisely, at every stage each
player $\infty mmunicates$ privately not only $his/her$ belief about the others’ actions
but also $his/her$ rationality as messagae according to aprotocol,l $\bm{t}d$ then the
recipient updatae their private information and revises $her/his$ prediction. In
addition, the players are assumed to be rational and $ma\partial cimizing$ their expected
utility according their beliek at every stage. When aplayer communicat\’e with
another, the other players are not informed about the contents of the message.
The main thmrem says that the players’ predictions regarding the future be-
liefs converge in the long run, which lead to amixed @trategy Nash equilibrium
of agame. The emphasis is on the three points: First that each player sends
not exact information about $his/her$ individual conjecture but robust informa.
tion about the actions greater than $his/her$ exact conjectures as the conditional
probability under $his/her$ private lnformation, secondly that each player’s pre-
diction is not required to be common-knowledge among all players, and finally
that the communication graph is not aesumed to be acyclic.
Many authors have studied the learning processes modeled by Bayesian up-
dating. The papers by E. Kalai and E. Lehrer [5] $\bm{t}d$ J. S. Jordan [4] (and ref-
erences in therein) indicate increasing interest in the mutual learning procaesae
in games that leads to equilibrium: Each player starts with initial $erron\infty us$ be-
lief regarding the actions of all the other players. They show the two strategiae
converges to an $\epsilon$-mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the repeated game.
1 When a player communicates with another, the other players are not informed about
the contents of the maesage.
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As for as J.F. Nash’s fundamental notion of strategic equilibrium is con-
cerned, R.J. Aumann and A. Brandenburger [1] gives epistemic conditions for
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium: They show that the common-knowledge of
the predictions of the players having the partitional information (that is, equiv-
alently, the $S5$-knowledge model) yields a Nash equilibrium of a game. However
it is not clear just what learning process leads to the equilibrium.
To fill this gap from epistemic point of view, Matsuhisa ([6], [8], [9]) presents
his communication system for a strategic game, which leads a mixed Nash equi-
librium in several epistemic models. The articles [6], [8] [10] treats the com-
munication model in the $S4$-knowledge model where each player communicates
to other players by sending exact information about $his/her$ conjecture on the
others’ action. In Matsuhisa and Strokan [10], the communication model in the
p-belief system is $introduced:^{2}Each$ player sends exact information that $he/she$
believes that the others play their actions with probability at least $his/her$ con-
jecture as messages. Matsuhisa [9] extend$ed$ the communication model to the
case that the sending messages are non-exact information that $he/she$ believes
that the others play their actions with probability at least $his/her$ conjecture.
This article is in the line of [9]; each player sends $his/her$ robust information
about the actions greater than $his/her$ exact conjectures as the conditional prob-
ability under $his/her$ private information in the Bayesian communication model
presented in Matsuhisa [9].
This paper organizes as follows. Section 2 recalls the $p$-belief system associ-
ated with a partition information structure, and we extend a game on p.belief
system. The Bayesian belief communication process for the game is introduced
where the players send robust messages about their conjectures about the other
players’ action. In Section 3 we give the formal statement of the main theorem
(Theorem 1) and sketch the proof. In Section 4 we conclude with remarks. The
illustrated example will be shown in the lecture presentation at $AI^{*}IA$ 2007.
2 The Model
Let $\Omega$ be a non-empty finite set called a state-space, $N$ a set of finitely many
players $\{1, 2, \ldots n\}$ at least two $(n\geq 2)$ , and let $2^{\Omega}$ be the family of all subsets
of $\Omega$ . Each member of $2^{\Omega}$ is called an event and each element of $\Omega$ called a
state. Let $\mu$ be a probability measure on $\Omega$ which is common for all players.
For simplicity it is assumed that $(\Omega, \mu)$ is a finite probability space with $\mu$ full
support.3
2.1 p-Belief System4
2 C.f.: Monderer and Samet [11] for the p-belief system.
3 That is; $\mu(w)\neq 0$ for every $\omega\in\Omega$ .
4 Monderer and Samet [11].
119
Let $p$ be a real number with $0<p\leq 1$ . The p-belief system associated with the
partition information structure $(\Pi_{i})_{i\in N}$ is the tuple
$\langle N, \Omega,\mu, (\Pi_{i})_{i\in N}, (B_{i}(*,p))_{i\in N}\rangle$
consisting of the following structures and interpretations: $(\Omega, \mu)$ is a finite prob-
ability space, and $i’ s$ p-belief opemtor $B_{i}(*;p)$ is the operator on $2^{\Omega}$ such that
$B_{i}(E,p)$ is the set of states of $\Omega$ in which $i$ p-believes that $E$ has occurred with
probability at least $p$ ; that is,
$B_{i}(E;p)$ $:=\{\omega\in\Omega|\mu(E|\Pi_{i}(\omega))\geq p\}$ .
Remark 1. When $p=1$ the l-belief operator $B_{i}(*;1)$ becomes the knowledge
operator for S5-1ogic, i.e. the operator corresponding to the partition on a state
space.
2.2 Game on p-Belief System5
By a game $G$ we mean a finite strategic form game
$\langle N, (A_{i})_{i\in N}, (g_{i})_{i\in N}\rangle$
with the following structure and interpretations: $N$ is a finite set of players
$\{1, 2, \ldots,i, \ldots n\}$ with $n\geq 2,$ $A_{i}$ is a flnite set of $i’ s$ actions (or $i’ s$ pure strategies)
and $g_{i}$ is an $i’ s$ payoff function of $A$ into $R$, where $A$ denotes the product
$A_{1}\cross A_{2}\cross\cdots xA_{n},$ $A_{-i}$ the product $A_{1}\cross A_{2}x\cdots\cross A_{i-1}\cross A_{i+1}\cross\cdots\cross$
$A_{\mathfrak{n}}$ . We denot$e$ by $g$ the n-tuple $(g_{1},g_{2}, \ldots g_{n})$ and by $a_{-i}$ the $(n-1)$-tuple
$(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{i-1}, a_{i+1}, \ldots, a_{n})$ for $a$ of $A$ . Furthermore we denote $a_{-I}=(a_{i})_{i\in N\backslash I}$
for each $I\subset N$ .
A probability distribution $\phi_{i}$ on A-.i is said to be $i’ s$ overall conjecture (or
simply $is$ conjecture). For each player $j$ other than $i$ , this induces the marginal
distribution on $j’ s$ actions; we call it $i’ s$ individual conjecture about $j$ (or simply
$is$ conjecture about $j.$ ) Functions on $\Omega$ are viewed like random variables in the
probability space $(\Omega, \mu)$ . If $x$ is a such function and $x$ is a value of it, we denote
by $[x=x]$ (or simply by $[x]$ ) the set $\{w\in\Omega|x(\omega)=x\}$ .
The information structure $(\Pi_{i})$ with a common prior $\mu$ yields the distribution
on $A\cross\Omega$ defined by $q_{i}(a, \omega)=\mu([a=a]|\Pi_{i}(\omega))$ ; and the $i’ s$ overall conjecture
defined by the marginal distribution
$q_{i}(a_{-i},\omega)=\mu([a_{-i}=a_{-i}]|\Pi_{i}(w))$
which is viewed as a random variable of $\phi_{i}$ . We denote by $[q_{i}=\phi_{i}]$ the intersec-
tion $\bigcap_{a_{-i}\in A-:}[q_{i}(a_{-i})=\phi_{i}(a_{-i})]$ and denot$e$ by $[\phi]$ the intersection $\bigcap_{i\in N}[q_{i}=$
$\phi_{i}]$ . Let $g_{i}$ be a random variable of $is$ payoff function $g_{i}$ and $*$ a random vari-
able of an $i’ s$ action $a_{i}$ . Where we assume that $\Pi_{\mathfrak{i}}(\omega)\subseteq 1\%$] $:=[*=a_{i}]$ for all
$w\in[a_{i}]$ and for every $a_{i}$ of $A_{:}$ . $i’ s$ action $a_{i}$ is said to be actual at a state $w$ if
5 Aumann and Brandenburger [1]
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$w\in[a_{i}=a_{i}]$ ; and the profile $a_{I}$ is said to be actually played at $\omega$ if $\omega\in[a_{I}=$
$a_{I}]$ $:= \bigcap_{i\in I}[a_{i}=a_{i}]$ for $I\subset N$ . The pay off functions $g=(g_{1}, g_{2}, \ldots, g_{n})$ is said
to be actually played at a state $\omega$ if $\omega\in[g=g]$ $:= \bigcap_{i\in N}[g_{i}=g_{i}]$ . Let Exp




A player \’i is said to be rational at $\omega$ if each $is$ actual action $a_{i}$ maximizes
the expectation of his actually played pay off function $g_{i}$ at $\omega$ when the other
players actions are distributed according to his conjecture $q_{i}(\cdot;\omega)$ . Formally,
letting $g_{i}=g_{i}(\omega)$ and $a_{l}=4(w),$ $Exp(g_{i}(a_{i},a_{-i});\omega)\geq Exp(g_{i}(b_{i}, a_{-:});w)$ for
every $b_{i}$ in $A_{i}$ . Let $R_{i}$ denote the set of all of the states at which $i$ is rational.
2.3 Protocol 6
We assume that the players communicate by sending messages. Let $T$ be the time
horizontal line $\{0,1,2, \cdots t, \cdots\}$ . A protocol is a mapping $Pr:Tarrow N\cross N,$ $t\vdash+$
$(s(t), r(t))$ such that $s(t)\neq r(t)$ . Here $t$ stands for time and $s(t)$ and $r(t)$ are,
r\’epectively, the sender and the receiver of the communication which takes place
at time $t$ . We consider the protocol as the directed graph whose vertices are the
set of all players $N$ and such that there is an edge (or an arc) from $i$ to $j$ if and
only if there are infinitely many $t$ such that $s(t)=i$ and $r(t)=j$ .
A protocol is said to be fair if the graph is strongly-connected; in words,
every player in this protocol communicates directly or indirectly with every
other player infinitely often. It is said to contain a cycle if there are players
$i_{1},$ $i_{2},$
$\ldots,$
$i_{k}$ with $k\geq 3$ such that for all $m<k,$ $i_{m}$ communicates directly with
$i_{m+1}$ , and such that $i_{k}$ communicates directly with $i_{1}$ . The communications is
assumed to proceed in rounds7
2.4 Communication on $p$-Belief System
Let $\epsilon$ be a real number with $0\leq\epsilon<1$ . A Bayesian belief communication process
$\pi(G)$ with revisions of players’ conjectures $(\phi_{\dot{l}}^{t})_{(i,t)\in NxT}$ according to a protocol
for a game $G$ is a tuple
$\pi(G)=\langle Pr, (\Pi_{i}^{t})_{i\in N}, (B_{i}^{t})_{i\in N}, (\phi_{i}^{t})_{(i,t)\in NxT}\rangle$
with the following structures: the players have a common prior $\mu$ on $\Omega$ , the
protocol $Pr$ among $N,$ $Pr(t)=(s(t),r(t))$ , is fair and it satisfies the conditions
that $r(t)=s(t+1)$ for every $t$ and that the communications proceed in rounds.
The revised information structure $\Pi_{i}^{t}$ at time $t$ is the mapping of $\Omega$ into $2^{\Omega}$ for
player $i$ . If $i=s(t)$ is a sender at $t$ , the message sent by $i$ to $j=r(t)$ is $M_{:}^{t}$ . An
n-tuple $(\phi_{i}^{t})_{i\in N}$ is a revision process of individual conjectures. These structures
are inductively defined as follows:
6 C.f.: Parikh and Krasucki [13]
7 There exists a time $m$ such that for all $t,$ $Pr(t)=Pr(t+m)$ . The peltod of the
protocol is the minimal number of all $m$ such that for every $t,$ $Pr(t+m)=Pr(t)$ .
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-Set $\Pi_{i}^{0}(w)=\Pi_{i}(\omega)$ .
-Assume that $\Pi_{i}^{t}$ is defined. It yields the distribution
$q_{i}^{t}(a,w)=\mu([a=a]|\Pi_{i}^{t}(\omega))$ .
Whence
$\bullet$ $R_{i}^{t}$ denotes the set of all the state $\omega$ at which $i$ is rational according to
his conjecture $q_{i}^{t}($ . ; $\omega)$ ; that is, each $is$ actual action $a_{i}$ maximizes the
expectation of his pay off function $g_{i}$ being actually played at $\omega$ when the
other players actions are distributed according to his conjecture $q_{i}^{t}(\cdot ; \omega)$
at time $t^{8}$
$\bullet$ The message $M_{i}^{t}$ : $\Omegaarrow 2^{\Omega}$ sent by the sender $i$ at time $t$ is defined as a
robust information:
$M_{i}^{t}( \omega)=\bigcap_{a_{-i}\in A-:}\{\xi\in\Omega|q_{i}^{t}(a_{-i},\xi)\geq q_{i}^{t}(a_{-i},\omega)\}$
.
Then:
-The revised partition $\Pi_{i}^{t+q}$ at time $t+1$ is defined as folows:
$\bullet\Pi_{i}^{t+1}(w)=\Pi_{i}^{t}(\omega)\cap M_{s(t)}^{t}(w)$ if $i=r(t)$ ;
$\bullet$ $\Pi_{i}^{t+1}(w)=\Pi_{i}^{t}(w)$ otherwise,
– The revision process $(\phi_{i}^{t})_{(i,t)\in NxT}$ of conjectures is inductively defined as
follows:
$\bullet\bullet Let\omega_{0}\in\Omega,$
$andset\phi_{s(0)}^{0}(a_{-s(0)}):=q_{s}^{0_{\mathfrak{b}^{0)}}}(a_{-\epsilon(0)},\omega_{0})Take\omega_{1}\in M_{s(0)}^{0}(w_{0})\cap B_{r(0)}([g_{s(0)}]\cap R_{s(0)};p)^{9}andset\phi_{s(1)}^{1}(a_{-s(1)}):=$
$\bullet Tq^{1}A_{e}^{1)}(a_{-\epsilon(1)},w_{1})$
$w_{t+1}\in M_{s(t)}^{t}(\omega_{t})\cap B_{r(t)}([g_{s(t)}]\cap R_{s(t)}^{t};p)$ ,
and set
$\phi_{\epsilon(t+1)}^{t+1}(a_{-s(t+1)})$ $:=q_{i}^{t+1}(a_{-s(t+1)},\omega_{t,.+1})$ .
The specification is that a sender $s(t)$ at time $t$ informs the receiver $r(t)his/her$
individual conjecture about the other players‘ actions with a probability greater
than $his/her$ belief. The receiver revises $her/his$ information structure under the
information. $She/he$ predicts the other players action at the state where the
player p-believes that the sender $s(t)$ is rational, and $she/he$ informs $her/his$ the
predictions to the other player $r(t+1)$ .
We denote by $\infty$ a sufficient large $\tau$ such that for all $w\in\Omega,$ $q_{i}^{\tau}(\cdot;\omega)=$
$q_{i}^{\tau+1}$ $($ . ; $w)=q_{i}^{\tau+2}(\cdot ; w)=\cdots$ . Hence we can write $q_{i}^{\tau}$ by $q_{i}^{\infty}$ and $\phi_{1}^{\tau}$ by $\phi_{i}^{\infty}$ .
Remark 2. This communication model is a variation of the model introduced by
Matsuhisa [6].





An player $i$ is said to be rational according to his conjecture $q_{i}^{\iota}($ . , $w)$ at $w$ if for all
$b_{:}$ in $A_{i}$ , Expt $(g:(a:,a_{-i});w)\geq Exp^{t}(g:(b_{i},a-:);w)$ .
9 We denote $[g_{i}]:=[g_{1}=g_{t}]$
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3 The Result
We can now state the main thmrem :
Theorem 1. Suppose that the players in a stmtegic form game $G$ have the
knowledge structure with $\mu$ a common prior. In the Bayesian belief communi-
cation process $\pi(G)$ according to a protocol $Pr$ among all players in the game,
the n-tuple of their conjectures $(\phi_{i}^{t})_{(i,t)\in N\cross T}$ converges to a mixed strategy Nash
equilibmum of the game in finitely many steps.
The proof is based on the below proposition:
Proposition 1. Notation and assumptions are the same in Theorem 1. For any
players $i,j\in N$, their conjectures $q_{i}^{\infty}$ and $q_{j}^{\infty}$ on $A\cross\Omega$ must coincide; that is,
$q_{1}^{\infty}(a;\omega)=q_{j}^{\infty}(a;\omega)$ for every $a\in A$ and $w\in\Omega$ .
Proof. On noting that $Pr$ is fair, it suffices to verify that $q_{i}^{\infty}(a;\omega)=q_{j}^{\infty}(a;\omega)$
for $(i,j)=(s(\infty),r(\infty))$ . Since $\Pi_{i}(\omega)\subseteq[a;]$ for all $\omega\in[a_{i}]$ , we can observe that
$q_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-i};\omega)=q_{i}^{\infty}(a;w)$ , and we let define the partitions of $\Omega,$ $\{W_{i}^{\infty}(w)|\omega\in\Omega\}$
and { $Q_{j}^{\infty}(w)$ I $\omega\in\Omega$ }, as follows:
$W_{i}^{\infty}(w)$
$:= \bigcap_{a-:\in A-:}[q_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-i}, *)=q_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-;},\omega)]=\bigcap_{a\in A}[q_{i}^{\infty}(a, *)=q_{1}^{\infty}(a,w)]$
,
$Q_{j}^{\infty}(\omega)$ $:=\Pi_{j}^{\infty}(w)\cap W_{i}^{\infty}(\omega)$ .
It follows that
$Q_{j}^{\infty}(\xi)\subseteq W_{i}^{\infty}(\omega)$ for all $\xi\in W_{i}^{\infty}(\omega)$ ,
and hence $W_{i}^{\infty}(w)$ can be decomposed into a disjoint union of components $Q_{j}^{\infty}(\xi)$
for $\xi\in W_{i}^{\infty}(\omega)$ ;
$W_{i}^{\infty}(w)= \bigcup_{k=1,2,,m}\ldots Q_{j}^{\infty}(\xi_{k})$
for $\xi_{k}\in W_{i}^{\infty}(\omega)$ .
It can be observed that
$\mu([a=a]|W_{i}^{\infty}(w))=\sum_{k=1}^{m}\lambda_{k}\mu([a=a]|Q_{j}^{\infty}(\xi_{k}))$ (1)
for some $\lambda_{k}>0$ with $\sum_{k=1}^{m}\lambda_{k}=1^{10}$
On noting that $W_{j}^{\infty}(\omega)$ is decomposed into a disjoint union of components
$\Pi_{j}^{\infty}(\xi)$ for $\xi\in W_{j}^{\infty}(\omega)$ , it can be observed that
$q_{j}^{\infty}(a;\omega)=\mu([a=a]|W_{j}^{\infty}(w))=\mu([a=a]|\Pi_{j}^{\infty}(\xi_{k}))$ (2)
$1$ This property is caUed the convexity for the conditional probabihty $\mu(X|*)$ in Parikh
and Krasucki [13].
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for any $\xi_{k}\in W_{i}^{\infty}(w)$ . Furthermore we can verify that for every $w\in\Omega$ ,
$\mu([a=a]|W_{j}^{\infty}(\omega))=\mu([a=a]|Q_{j}^{\infty}(w))$ . (3)
In fact, we first not$e$ that $W_{j}^{\infty}(w)$ can also be decomposed into a disjoint union
of components $Q_{j}^{\infty}(\xi)$ for $\xi\in W_{j}^{\infty}(w)$ . We shall show that for every $\xi\in W_{j}^{\infty}(\omega)$ ,
$\mu([a=a]|W_{j}^{\infty}(\omega))=\mu([a=a]|Q_{j}^{\infty}(\xi))$ . For: Suppose not, the disjoint union $G$
of all the components $Q_{j}(\xi)$ such that $\mu([a=a]|W_{j}^{\infty}(w))=\mu([a=a]|Q_{j}^{\infty}(\xi))$ is
a proper subset of $W_{j}^{\infty}(\omega)$ . It can be shown that for some $w_{0}\in W_{j}^{\infty}(w)\backslash G$ such
that $Q_{j}(w_{0})=W_{j}^{\infty}(w)\backslash G$. On noting that $\mu([a=a]|G)=\mu([a=a]|W_{j}^{\infty}(\omega))$
it follows immediately that $\mu([a=a]|Q_{j}^{\infty}(w_{0}))=\mu([a=a]|W_{j}^{\infty}(w))$, in con-
tradiction. Now suppose that for every $\omega_{0}\in W_{j}^{\infty}(w)\backslash G,$ $Q_{j}(w_{0})\neq W_{j}^{\infty}(w)\backslash G$.
The we can take an infinite sequence of states $\{w_{k}\in W_{j}^{\infty}(\omega)|k=0,1,2,3, \ldots\}$
with $w_{k+1}\in W_{j}^{\infty}(\omega)\backslash (G\cup Q_{j}^{\infty}(w_{0})\cup Q_{j}^{\infty}(w_{1})\cup Q_{j}^{\infty}(\omega_{2})\cup\cdots\cup Q_{j}^{\infty}(w_{k}))$ in
contradiction also, because $\Omega$ is finite.
In viewing (1), (2) and (3) it follows that
$q_{i}^{\infty}(a;w)=\sum_{k=1}^{m}\lambda_{k}q_{j}^{\infty}(a;\xi_{k})$ (4)
for some $\xi_{k}\in W_{i}^{\infty}(\omega)$ . Let $\xi_{w}$ be the state in $\{\xi_{k}\}_{k=1}^{m}$ attains the maximal
value of all $q_{j}^{\infty}(a;\xi_{k})$ for $k=1,2,3,$ $\cdots,$ $m$ , and let $\zeta_{w}\in\{\xi_{k}\}_{k=1}^{m}$ be the state
that attains the minimal value. By (4) we obtain that $q_{j}^{\infty}(a;\zeta_{w})\leq q_{i}^{\infty}(a;\omega)\leq$
$q_{j}^{\infty}(a;\xi_{w})$ for $(i,j)=(s(\infty),t(\infty))$ .
On continuing this process according to the fair protocol $Pr$, it can be plainly
verified: For each $w\in\Omega$ and for any $t\geq 1$ ,
$q_{i}^{\infty}(a;\zeta_{w}’)\leq\cdots\leq q_{j}^{\infty}(a;\zeta_{w})\leq.q_{i}^{\infty}(a;w)\leq q_{j}^{\infty}(a;\xi_{\omega})\leq\cdots\leq q_{i}^{\infty}(a;\xi_{\omega}’)$
$q_{j}^{\infty}(a;\zeta_{w})\leq q_{j}^{\infty}(a;w)\leq q_{j}^{\infty}(a;\xi.)andq_{i}^{\infty}(a;\zeta)=q_{j}^{\infty}(a;\xi)forevery\zeta,\xi\in\Omega forsome\zeta_{w}’,\cdots,\zeta_{td},\xi_{w},$
$\cdots\xi_{\omega}’\in\Omega,andthusq_{i}^{\infty}(a;\omega)=q_{j}^{\infty}(a;\omega)because$
in completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1: We denote by $\Gamma(i)$ the set of all the players who directly
receive the message from $i$ on $N$ ; i.e., $\Gamma(i)=\{j\in N|(i,j)=Pr(t)$ for some $t\in$
$T\}$ . Let $F_{i}$ denote $[ \phi_{i}^{\infty}]:=\bigcap_{a-i\in A}:[q_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-i};*)=\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-i})]$. It is noted that
$F_{i}\cap F_{j}\neq\emptyset$ for each $i\in N,$ $j\in\Gamma(i)$ .
We observe the first point that for each $i\in N,$ $j\in\Gamma(i)$ and for every $a\in A$ ,
$\mu([a_{-j}=a_{-j}]|F_{i}\cap F_{j})=\phi_{j}^{\infty}(a_{-J})$ . Then summing over $a_{-i}$ , we can observe that
$\mu([*=a_{i}]|F_{i}\cap F_{j})=\phi_{j}^{\infty}(a_{i})$ for any $a\in A$ . In view of Proposition 1 it can
be observed that $\phi_{j}^{\infty}(h)=\phi_{k}^{\infty}(a_{i})$ for each $j,$ $k,$ $\neq i$ ; i.e., $\phi_{j}^{\infty}(a_{i})$ is independent
of the choices of every $j\in N$ other than $i$ . We set the probability distribution
$\sigma_{*}$
. on $A_{i}$ by $\sigma_{i}(a_{i}):=\phi_{j}^{\infty}(a_{i})$ , and set the profile $\sigma=(\sigma_{i})$ .
We observe the second point that for every $a \in\prod_{\mathfrak{i}\in N}Supp(\sigma_{i}),$ $\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-i})=$
$\sigma_{1}(a_{1})\cdots\sigma_{i-1}(a_{i-1})\sigma_{i+1}(a_{i+1})\cdots\sigma_{n}(a_{n})$ : In fact, viewing the definition of $\sigma_{i}$
we shall show that $\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-i})=\prod_{k\in N\backslash \{i\}}\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{k})$. To verify this it suffices to
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show that for every $k=1,2,$ $\cdots,$ $n,$ $\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-i})=\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-I_{k}})\prod_{k\in I_{k}\backslash \{i\}}\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{k})$ : We
prove it by induction on $k$ . For $k=1$ the result is immediate. Suppose it is true
for $k\geq 1$ . On noting the protocol is fair, we can take the sequence of sets of
players $\{I_{k}\}_{1\leq k\leq n}$ with the following properties:
(a) $I_{1}=\{i\}\subset I_{2}\subset\cdots\subset I_{k}\subset I_{k+1}\subset\cdots\subset I_{m}=N$ :
(b) For every $k\in N$ there is a player $i_{k+1} \in\bigcup_{j\in I_{k}}\Gamma(j)$ with $I_{k+1}\backslash I_{k}=\{i_{k+1}\}$ .
We let take $j\in I_{k}$ such that $i_{k+1}\in\Gamma(j)$ . Set $H_{i_{k+1}}$ $:=[a_{i_{k+1}}=a_{i_{k+1}}]\cap F_{j}\cap$
$F_{i_{k+1}}$ . It can be verified that $\mu([a_{-j-i_{k+1}}=a_{-j-i_{k+1}}]|H_{i_{k+1}})=\phi_{-j-i_{k+1}}^{\infty}(a_{-j})$.
Dividing $\mu(F_{j}\cap F_{i_{k+1}})$ yields that
$\mu([a_{-j}=a_{-j}]|F_{j}\cap F_{i_{k+1}})=\phi_{i_{k+1}}^{\infty}(a_{-j})\mu([a_{i_{k+1}}=a_{i_{k+1}}]|F_{j}\cap F_{i_{k+1}})$ .
Thus $\phi_{j}^{\infty}(a_{-j})=\phi_{i_{k+1}}^{\infty}(a_{-j-i_{k+1}})\phi_{j}^{t}(a_{i_{k+1}})$; then summing over $a_{I_{k}}$ we obtain
$\phi_{j}^{\infty}(a_{-I_{k}})=\phi_{i_{k+1}}^{\infty}(a_{-I_{k}-i_{k+1}})\phi_{j}^{\infty}(a_{i_{k+1}})$ . It immediately follows from Proposi-
tion 1 that $\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-I_{k}})=\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-I_{k}-i_{k+1}})\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a:_{k+1})$ , as required.
FUrthermore we can observe that all the other players $i$ than $j$ agree on the
same conjecture $\sigma_{j}(a_{j})=\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{j})$ about $j$ . We conclude that each action $a_{i}$
appearing with positive probability in $\sigma_{i}$ maximizes $g_{i}$ against the product of
the distributions $\sigma_{l}$ with $l\neq i$ . This implies that the profile $\sigma=(\sigma_{i})_{i\in N}$ is a
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of $G$ , in completing the proof. $\square$
4 Concluding remarks
We have observed that in a communication process with revisions of players’
beliefs about the other actions, their predictions induces a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium of the game in the long run. It is well to end some remarks on
related literatures. The S5-know1edge model is an operator model equivalent
to the Kripke semantics for the modal logic S5 $(=KT45)$ , which is the binary
relation on a state-space satisfying reflectivity, transitivity and symmetry. The
$S4$-knowledge model is equivalent to the Kripke semantics for the modal logic
S4 $(=KT4)$ , which is the binary relation on a state-space satisfying reflectivity,
transitivity.
Matsuhisa [6] and [8] established the same assertion in the S4-know1edge
model. Furthermore Matsuhisa [7] showed a similar result for $\epsilon$-mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium of a strategic form game in the S4-know1edge model, which
gives an epistemic aspect in Theorem of E. Kalai and E. Lehrer [5]. This article
highlights a communication among the players in a game through sending rough
information, and shows that the convergence to an exact Nash equilibrium is
guaranteed even in such communication on approximate information after long
run.
The main theorem in this article is an extension in the Bayesian communi-
cation for the $S5$-knowledge model.l1 There is an agenda to further research;
11 See $B\epsilon mark1$ .
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first, to extend our main theorem to $S4$-knowledge model, which gives another
generalization of the theorem for the S5-know1edge model, because it coincides
with the theorems in Matsuhisa [6] and [8], and secondly, to unify all the com-
munication models in the preceding papers ([6], [8], [10], [9]) including the result
presented in this article.
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